BATTALION HISTORY 1 February 69 thru 30 April 1969 (extracted from report
AD503771)
HEADQUARTERS, 145TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION APO San Francisco
96227
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion for
Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (PCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (U) (UIC: WCYNAA)
A. (C)
SECTION 1 - Operations Significant Activities
A. Chronology of significant
events
( 1) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion contained three Assault
Helicopter Companies, one Armed Helicopter Company and the USARV AH-1G Training
Team at the outset of this reporting period. On 7 March 1969, the USARV AH-1G
Training Team was transferred to the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion and
displaced to Vung Tau, completing the move on 9 March. By relocating to Vung
Tau, the team was able to obtain larger facilities in order to double the output
of the training program.
( 2) During this quarter the 145th continued to
support the allied forces within the III Corps Tactical Zone with primary
support provided to the three ARVN Divisions located within the III Corps
Tactical Zone. The 145th supported the BHTAC (Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command) in
the defense of Bien Hoa / Long Binh complex during the VC/ NVA forces ill fated
1969 post TET offensive which commenced on 23 February.
(3) The 68th, 118th,
and 190th Assault Helicopter Companies continued their primary support for the
25th ARVN DIV, 18th ARVN DIV, 5th ARVN DIV, 1st ARVN ABN DIV, III Corps and II
FFV General Support. The companies also provided general support to the 5th
Special Forces Group.
(4) The 334th Attack Helicopter Company continued it's
support of III Corps Firefly missions for the 25th ARVN DIV, BHTAC and CMAC
(Capital Military Assistance Command). It also provided Armed Helicopter support
for the 51st Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company and other allied units
within the III Corps Tactical Zone.
(5) From 1 February 1969 to 30 April 1969
the companies of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion flew 75, 867 sorties,
logging a total of 28, 755 flying hours. Troops carried numbered 147, 082 and
312 tons of cargo were transported in support of the forces in III Corps while
aircraft of this Battalion killed 491 enemy, damaged or distroyed 253
structures, and distroyed 530 sampans during the quarter. During this period,
the Battalion suffered 1 KIA, 1 killed not as a result of hostile action, and 14
WIA. 54 aircraft were damaged and 6 destroyed.
B. MISSION & ORGANIZATION
(1) Mission: The mission of the units has not changed during this reporting
period and continues to be as follows: To augment the aviation capabilities of
II Field Forces Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam Forces operating in III
Corps area.
(2) Organization:
(a) During the reporting period, USARV AH-1G
Training Team was relieved from assignment to the 145th Combat Aviation
Battalion and transferred to the 147th Assault Support Helicopter Company, of
the 214th Combat Aviation Battalion, located at Vung Tau.
(b) The
organization of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion during this reporting period
included the units depicted on the organizational chart located at Inclosure
1.
C. Command & Staff
(1) Significant personnel changes during the
reporting period were as follows:
(a) Commanding Officer, 145th Combat
Aviation Battalion No Change
(b) Bn Ex Officer Outgoing: LTC James J
Ransbotham, Incoming: MAJ Giffen A Marr (20 Feb 69)
(c) Bn S-1/ Adjutant
Outgoing: CPT John D. Hoskinson, In: CPT William M Walterhoefer (12 Feb
69)
Outgoing: CPT William M Walterhoefer, Incoming: CPT Garlos M Inacio (10
Mar 69)
(d) Battalion S-2 No change
(e) Battalion S-3 Outgoing: MAJ Giffon
A Marr, Incoming: MAJ Sammy L Childs (20 Feb 69)
(f) Battalion S-4 No
Change
(g) Commanding Officer, HHC, 145th CBT AVN BN No Change
(h)
Commanding Officer, 68th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) No Change
(I) Commanding Officer,
118th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) No Change
(j) Commanding Officer, 190th Avn Co (Aslt
Hel) No Change
(k) Ex-Officer, 190th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) Out: 1LT Herbert D.
Dyer, In: CPT Robert Estes (14 Feb 69)
Outgoing: CPT Robert Estes Incoming:
CPT John C Taylor (27 Mar 69)
(l) Commanding Officer, 334th Avn Co Out: MAJ
Charles Edwards In: MAJ Robert Arnold (22 Mar )
(m) Ex-Officer, 334th Avn Co
Out: MAJ Sammy Childs (20 Feb) In: CPT Charles Ritzschke (23 Mar)
(2) The
following are personnel occupying major command and staff positions as of 30
April 1969.
(a) LTC MC NAIR, Carl H. Jr. Battalion Commander (b) MAJ MARR,
Giffen A. Battalion Ex Off
(c) CPT INACIO, Carlos M. Adjutant (d) CPT JOHN,
Charles E. S-2
(e) MAJ CHILDS, Sammy L. S-3 (f) CPT MANLEY, Rufus S.
S-4
(g) MAJ WILLMORE, George H. Maintenance Officer (h) CPT BENNETT, Larry G.
Signal Officer
(I) CPT LOCATELLI, Stephen R. Safety Officer (j) MAJ
SLAUGHTER, William G Flight Surgeon
(k) CPT KING, Roba L. Chaplain (l) CPT
COBURN, George C. CO, HHC
(m) MAJ SAATHOFF, Donald I. CO, 68th (n) MAJ
BRITTON, John A CO, 118th
(o) MAJ MURRAY, Hershell B CO, 190th (p) MAJ
ARNOLD, Robert W. CO, 334th
(q) MAJ GRIMES, Eugene W. CO, 324th ASD
D.
Personnel - Unit Strengths as of 30 April 1969
UNIT OFFICERS WO EM
TOTAL
AUTH O/H AUTH O/H AUTH O/H AUTH O/H
68th 19 22 51 42 218 189 288
253
118th 19 22 51 41 218 201 288 264
190th 19 24 51 46 218 191 288
261
334th 17 17 39 35 198 169 254 221
HHC 18 24 3 5 86 103 107 132
Scty
Plt 0 0 0 0 28 36 28 36
430th 1 1 0 0 7 6 8 7
520th 1 1 0 0 7 8 8 9
E. Intelligence and Physical Security
(1) During the period of 1 February
1969 through 30 April 1969, enemy action was high-lighted by two enemy contacts
at Bien Hoa Air Force Base. The first contact was on the morning of 23 February
1969 when, after an attack by fire on the base, an enemy unit attempted to
penetrate the southern perimeter of the base. This particular portion of the
perimeter is manned jointly by the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 3rd
Security Police Squadron. The second contact was on the East perimeter on 26
February 1969 when an estimated battalion of the 275th VC/ NVA Regiment was
detected moving towards the base. During the ensuing battle approximately
290-300 enemy troops were either capture or killed. Approximately 90% were
attributed to air action. Since that time the enemy activity in the Bien Hoa
area has been extremely light and restricted principally to limited harrassing
attacks by fire.
(2) The physical security in the battalion was improved
significantly during the reporting period. Improvements included the
construction of additional sapper bunkers along the western edge of the ramp
area, the relocation of the listening post bunkers so as to provided wider
coverage of the area between Honor-Smith Compound and the Ammunition Supply
Point, the use of Starlight Scopes in the perimeter guard towers, and the use of
sentry dogs from the 3rd Security Police Squadron to guard against enemy sapper
attacks from the West against the Battalion Headquarters and the ramp area.
Additionally, a detailed and comprehensive defense plan encompassing all-around
defense and increased defense in depth of the Battalion area was adopted. All of
these innovations have served to greatly enhance the security and defensive
posture of the 145th Combat Aviation Battalion's area of responsibility.
(3)
Included in the defense of the airfield has been the "Totem Pole Flare" which
offers instant and effective perimeter illumination. This innovation was advised
by the 3rd Security Police Squadron of Bien Hoa Air Base. The ground mounted
flares are used to give immediate sustained high intensity illumination in the
event of an enemy attack on the perimeter. (See ORLL, Intelligence section.)
Also in the testing stage for perimeter illumination is a new low intensity
lighting system constructed of two inch water pipe and a mini-gun ammunition
boxes mounting 200 watt bulbs. This system will provide for low intensity
illumination up to 100 meters out on the perimeter. This system is also being
constructed and tested by the 3rd Security Police Squadron around the entire
Bien Hoa Air Base perimeter. To back up and increase the effectiveness of the
above mentioned illumination improvements, Fire-Fly teams now perform a sweep of
the perimeter each trip they depart and return to the airfield on other
missions. This provides a total of six to eight perimeter sweeps by Fire-Fly
each and every night, yet does not detract from the Fire-Fly mission itself. The
sweep requires approximately five minutes and this accomplished within the
Battalion Control Zone
F. Operations and Training
(1) Combat
Operations:
(a) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion continues to be committed
daily to task varying from direct support missions to combat assault operations.
The battalion is normally committed daily for two combat assault helicopter
companies, one general support helicopter company, and a variety of armed
helicopter missions. The normal mission package for the combat assault is nine
UH-1D/H lift helicopters, one command and control helicopter, one maintenance
helicopter, one smoke helicopter and four armed helicopters from the unit's
assets. For General Support missions, the normal commitment for support of III
Corps and II Field Forces Vietnam is 13 UH-1D/H and two light fire teams
(UH-1C).
(b) The 334th Aviation Company (Attack Helicopter), one of the three
all AH-1G "Cobra" units now serving in Vietnam, provides three Fire-Fly teams
nightly to interdict sampan traffic on the rivers and canals in III Corps
Tactical Zone. They also afford defense of the Saigon, Long Binh and Bien Hoa
complexes.
(c) The 334th also supports the 51st LRP company with two light
fire teams on a 24 hour a day bases. In addition, they provide armed escort
missions as required by II Field Forces AAE and 145th Cbt Avn Bn B.O.C. As such,
they are called upon to augment the armed helicopter capability of the assault
companies during contact situations. Because of the greater speed, payload and
endurance, this augmentation can be extremely valuable to the Air Mission
Commanders.
(2) Counter Mortar:
(a) The Bien Hoa Air Base was subject to
enemy rockets/mortar fire on five occasions during this reporting period. These
attacks occurred as shown below:
DATE/ TIME NUMBER OF ROUNDS DAMAGE TO BN
AREA
230210 February 54 Minor Damage - 2 Buildings
Light Damage - 1
AH-1G
230555 February 6 None
232105 February 2 None
290220 March 6
None
312347 March 14 None
(b) During this reporting period, the 145th
Combat Aviation Battalion retained the responsibility of primary command and
control of all armed helicopter light fire teams utilized in support of Oplan
Checkmate in the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex. A command and control helicopters
is flown nightly to reconnoiter the entire complex within the battalion's area
of responsibility and then remains on a 5 minute standby from 2100 hrs until
0600 hrs each night.
(3) Training:
(a) During this reporting period the
assigned training task for VNAF UH-1 transition training has increased
threefold. As reported in the previous ORLL, six VNAF pilots (1 staff officer
and 5 pilots) underwent transition training in the UH-1D and two aviators in the
UH-1C armed helicopter. Currently, there are 16 VNAF pilots undergoing
transition training in the UH-1D (3 staff officers and 13 pilots). This
significant increase from the previous quarter has placed a larger demand on the
IP's and unit training programs; however, due to centralization of ground
school, all students are rapidly transitioned and released to operational
missions with experienced aviators throughout the Battalion.
(b)
Understandably, this accelerated program has caused some scheduling problems,
such as shortage of aircraft and instructor pilots ( these problems will be
discussed more thoroughly in Lessons Learned) since training aircraft are not
authorize per se. Only after all missions have been met may an aircraft be
utilized for training purposes. No associated reduction of missions is possible
even with the large increase in training requirements, hence scheduling becomes
extremely critical. Once the initial transition is completed, training
progresses quite rapidly since the trainees are committed daily to operational
missions. Students are generally quite enthusiastic and complete their training
programs with a full understanding of airmobile operations, having flown almost
every position in the flight and a variety of general support missions.
G.
Logistics
(1) During this period, a long awaited Crash Investigation Kit, FSN
5180-9O3-1049, was obtained through 34th Group AMMC in Saigon, and carrying
through the unit's supporting DSU directly to AMMC. The kit is complete in every
respect and has proven an invaluable aid during on-the-scene accident
investigation.
(2) Class V: Unit basic loads are being maintained in
accordance with USARV Regulations 735-28 and 700-7. All unit basic loads for
small arms in 7.62mm for ground mounted M-60 machine gun have now been placed on
1 1/2 ton trailers to provide increased mobility in transporting ammunition to
perimeter defensive positions. These trailers are all revetted in the Battalion
ASP for immediate deployment by unit as required.
(3) Constuction:
(a) On
16 April, 1969 this Headquarters organize forwarded through 12th Group to 1st
Aviation Brigade a DD Form 1391 Military Construction Line Item Data to provide
adequate water supply at a pressure consistent with existing requirements. The
existing facilities are highly inadequate and include boilers currently
inoperative do to low pressure in the distribution system. This project would
provide water for operation of future and existing facilities currently without
adequate water supply.
(b) On 18 March, 1969, Engineers from the 159th
Engineer Group began construction of two BOQ"s adjacent to the Honor-Smith
compound for the 68th Avn Co (Aslt Hel). Once the construction is completed, all
of the officers and warrant officers of the 145th CAB will be located in
Honor-Smith Compound. The troop billets now occupied by officers of the 68th
will be vacated and become enlisted quarters.
(4) During this period all M-
60 machine guns had the bullet ramp angle modified in accordance with MWO
9-1000-232-30/ 1. This particular MWO applied only to machine guns with a serial
number of 77605 and lower and once the MWO was completed, an "R" suffix was and
to the weapon serial number. The MWO was accomplished by the supporting
DSU.
H. Safety
(1) Aviation Safety Programs: The safety program continues
as the responsibility of the commander and all members of the command
administered by the Aviation Safety Officer.
(2) Publications: The Aviation
Safety Officer publishes a monthly safety newsletter which includes articles and
tips on aviation safety, changes in procedures, safety slogans, and a safety
letter from the Battalion Commander. Each aviation company contributes and
article on safety each month and wide distribution is made to the companies. The
Aviation Safety Officer also maintains the Battalion Safety Buttetin Board and
prepares Battalion safety posters for appropriate display.
(3) Safety
Council: A Battalion Safety Council composed of the Battalion Commander,
Battalion Executive Officer, S-3, Flight Surgeon, Battalion Aviation Safety
Officer, Battalion Maintenance Officer, and all Company Commanders, Aviation
Safety Officers, and Maintenance Officers meets monthly to discuss problem areas
with respect to aviation safety along with reviewing all recent accidents and
incidents occurring in the Battalion. Information discussed therein is later
discussed at each company safety meeting.
(4) Accident Investigation Kit: An
accident investigation kit was obtained through supply channals during the past
quarter. This kit, which includes a Polaroid camera and portable tape recorder,
contains all equipment necessary to conduct the on-site portion of the accident
investigation.
(5) Accidents: There has been an overall increase in the
accident rate during the past ninety days although the fiscal year rate
continues to be below the USARV and 12th Cbt Avn Gp averages. Over 60 percent of
the accidents were caused by pilots error while the remainder were caused by
material failure and maintenance error. There have been 11 major accidents, no
minor accidents, 3 incidents, 2 forced landings, and 24 precautionary landings.
The following is a list of the accidents and incidents reported during the
period:
ACCIDENTS
Lost Control 3 Lost RPM 1
Low side governor failure 2
Engine failure 1
Tail rotor failure 1 Pilot not at controls 1
Collective
sleeve bearing failure 1 Flew into flag pole 1
INCIDENTS
Struck revetment
1 Landed hard 1
Damage to blades while hovering 1
6) The total flight time
for the reporting period is 29, 087 hours for an accident rate of 37.8 per 100,
000 hours. The fiscal year rate is 18. 7 per 100, 000 hours.
I. Signal
(1)
Voice Secure: Radio sets AN/PRC-77 were issued to the entire Battalion during
this reporting period. The capabilities of this radio will greatly improve the
secure means of communication. This equipment, when use with speech scrambler
KY- 38, will provide a portable, battery operated system which can be utilized
in areas that are impractical or inaccessible to a similar vehicle mounted set,
i.e., guard posts, bunkers, etc.
(2) Land Line Teletype: Due to a marked
increase in teletype messages, it was necessary to acquire an additional
teletype set. With this additional teletype, one set can be utilized to prepare
outgoing traffic in a prepunched form while the other set is receiving incoming
traffic. This eliminates the amount of time expended by an operator who
previously had to wait for the line to be free of incoming messages before he
could prepare the outgoing message.
(3) Avionics: With the implementation of
MTOE's, the 190th AHC was assigned an avionics detachment. This alleviated the
work load of the direct support attachment that had been maintaining the
avionics equipment for both the 190th AHC and the 118th AHC. This new avionics
team has increased the number of avionics trained personnel within the
Battalion. The addition of the 243rd Sig Det which has been assigned and
transferred to the 190th AHC has greatly alleviated the work load of the
avionics maintenance personnel. This diminished work load has provided faster
and more reliable service to the avionics equipment.
J. Awards and
Decorations: The following awards and decorations were processed during the
reporting period:
SUBMITTED AWARD RECEIVED
1 Legion of Merit 1
2 Silver
Star 3
22 Distinguish Flying Cross 14
14 Bronze Star 11
14 Air Medal
with "V" Device 4
34 Army Commendation Medal 30
3 Purple Heart 13
2632
Air Medal 2749
(TO BE CONTINUED)
K. Rest and Recuperation: In an effort to better
facilitate the desires of each man in reaching his chosen R&R site, new
procedures were established. Each company forwards, on the first of the
preceding month for which R&R's are allocated, the number of seats to each
location they desire based upon the request of personnel within their company.
This enables battalion, when allocating seats, to satisfy the greatest number of
personnel and precludes needless turnbacks of seats. The number of battalion
personnel going on R&R the past quarter increase to 280.
L. Public
Information
(1) The Public Information Office has broadly expended its
program during the period 1 Feb 69 - 30 Apr 69. It worked with representatives
from the New York Times, CBS, NBC, and the Federal Republic of Germany TV
network.
(2) Use of the Battalion photographer was expended to include
coverage of aircraft accidents, vehicular accidents, orphanage visits, celebrity
visits, promotions, award ceremonies, and any other official functions that are
of interest to members of the command.
(3) In addition to taking the
photographs, the Battalion has an in-house capability of developing the pictures
since the construction of a photo lab containing the basic facilities necessary
for complete processing.
(4) Command emphasis has been placed on the Hometown
News Release Program. During this reporting period, 115 individual releases were
submitted to the U.S. Army News Release Center.
M. Chaplain
ITEM OCCASIONS
ATTENDANCE AVERAGE SUNDAY
ATTENDANTS
Protestant 20 433 22
Catholic (
Handled by BHAB Catholic Chaplain and Facilities)
Memorial Services 2 118
-
Religious Education 6 58 6
Counseling 553 - -
Troop Visits 267 -
-
Hospital Visits 26 - -
Character Guidance
Lectures 21 1321
-
Character Guidance
Orientations 3 1065 -
Incountry Orientations 3 63
-
N. Civic Action
(1) The 145th Combat Aviation Battalion procured and
distributed 569 pounds of pediatrics foods and formula to the Tan Mai Orphanage,
Bien Hoa. The water supply of the Tan Mai Orphanage was tested, found to be
contaminated and corrective measures are being taken. Supplementary potable
water was provided which involved securing tankage for transportation and
storage. A programs was instituted to avoid future contamination, and the spread
of communicable diseases among the infants and children.
(2) At the Tan Mai
Orphanage, a program of medical and dental visitation was established. The
medical programs included diagnosis, treatment, and preventative measure. The
dental programs included fluoridation treatment, dental examination, and
providing personal individual dental hygiene items. Approximately 150 infants
and children received aid through the over-all program.
(3) The children of
the Dan Minh Orphanage were entertained at an Easter egg hunt and dinner on 6
April. This project was organized and funded by the 68th Avn Co (Aslt
Hel).
(4) The 68th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) undertook sponsorship of the Dan Minh
Orphanage with plans to provide personal hygiene items and to give aid to their
present construction program.
(5) The 190th Avn Co (Aslt Hel) assumed
sponsorship of a baseball team with the Vietnamese Boy Scouts of Bien Hoa Air
Base. This programs encompasses the provision of training, equipment, uniforms
and social functions for the boys, of whom approximately 35 Scouts are currently
involved.
O. Reenlistment Program
During this reporting period, with added
command emphasis, the reenlistment rate within this battalion has shown
substantial increase in the first term Regular Army Reenlistment and career
personnel reenlistment. A programs of closer coordination between the battalion
career counselor and the company reenlistment NCO's and an expanded reenlistment
publicity program has resulted in the reenlistment statistically depicted
below:
1ST TERM RA AUS CAREER PERCENT TOTAL
Elig Re-enl Elig Re-enl Elig
Re-enl
Jan 13 2 6 0 2 2 19%
Feb 9 3 13 1 2 2 25%
Mar 10 2 8 0 3 3
23.8%
II. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation and
Recommendations
A. Personnel: NONE
B. Operations:
1. Lack of adequate
personal weapons for crewmembers of theAH-1G
a. OBSERVATION: During the past
year, this battalion has had several AG-1G ( Cobras) shot or forced down in
enemy territory. There have been several cases when the crewmembers were forced
to remain on the ground for periods of time extending up to 45 minutes, armed
only with the standard issue .45 caliber pistol.
b. EVALUATION: The standard
issue .45 caliber pistol will offer very little protection should a crew be
required to defend itself while awaiting rescue or during escape and evasion.
Due to limited space inside the cockpit of an AH-1G, most shoulder fired weapons
are too large to be carried.
c. RECOMMENDATION: That the U.S. Air Force CAR
15 submachine gun be a standard issue weapon for all crewmembers of the AH-1G.
This weapon, being compact in size, would allow both crewmembers to stow it in
the space available. The CAR 15 would offer sufficient firepower for the crew to
defend themselves should they be forced down and hostile territory.
d.
COMMAND ACTION:
(1) A command letter has been forwarded to the Commanding
Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group for consideration and referral to higher
headquarters.
(2) The 334th Aviation Company ( Attack Helicopter) is
preparing a change to the MTOE to include the CAR 15 as the individual crew
weapon for the crewmembers of the AH-1G.
2. Lack of equipment for marking
aircraft forced down at night
a. OBSERVATION: During the month of December,
1968, an aircraft from this battalion was shot down in hostile territory during
the hours of darkness. Due to fuel requirements, the rescue aircraft had to
depart the area soon after the crash occurred. An aircraft subsequently
scrambled to secure the aircraft could not locate it upon arrival. Due to
darkness a period of approximately four (4) hours elapsed before the downed
aircraft could be located.
b. EVALUATION: No provisions have been made for
marking of downed aircraft at night. Normal aircraft lighting will not suffice
due to the necessity of the battery switch being left off, otherwise causing a
fire hazard. Even when it is possible to use the aircraft lights, they would be
visible to the enemy ground forces thereby giving away the aircraft's position
should the enemy also be searching for it.
c. RECOMMENDATION: That all
crewmembers be instructed to carry some type of flashlight or strobe light that
can be fastened to the aircraft. It is recommended that the light be secured in
a manner that will allow it to be visible from the air only.
d. COMMAND
ACTION:
(1) All pilots of this command have been instructed to carry and
utilize a means of marking their aircraft, either strobe lights or a
flashlight.
(2) Additional strobe lights have been requested and all
companies are putting them in their emergency kits.
3. Difficulty encountered
by ground troops in marking enemy positions
a. OBSERVATION: Numerous
occasions have been encountered by all units of the battalion when the enemy
situation and terrain made it impossible for the ground elements to properly
mark enemy targets.
b. EVALUATION: Accurate marking of enemy targets and
positions to provide definite target identification for the helicopter gunship
is essential to eliminate possibility of injury to friendly ground forces.
c.
RECOMMENDATION: The use of a smoke round for theM-79 Grenade Launcher would
enable ground forces to more accurately mark enemy targets. The increased range
of the M-79 would greatly reduce the risk of injury to friendly personnel. The
accuracy of the M-79 would allow pin-point marking of enemy positions without
exposing friendly personnel to hostile fire.
d. COMMAND ACTION:
(1) The
battalion S-3 will brief the American advisors to ARVN units, during his monthly
briefings, on the advantages of using smoke rounds in the M-79 Grenade launcher.
The marking of enemy positions in this manner will enable fire teams to place
accurate fire immediately on the target.
4. Protection of avionics
equipment
a. OBSERVATION: With the advent of the rainy season, avionics
equipment will again be exposed to water and damp conditions due to rain
showers. These conditions in the past have resulted in an increased failure of
avionics equipment.
b. EVALUATION: Units of this battalion have operated with the pilots' doors
removed with extremely satisfying results and greatly improved visibility.
However, a serious drawback has arisen during the monsoon season. If the
aircraft remains on the ground during a rain shower, no protections is afforded
the electronics console. If water is allowed to collect on the console, an
increase in the failure rate of avionics equipment will result.
c.
RECOMMENDATION: Each aircraft should carry a poncho or a plastic covering an the
storage compartment. If the aircraft is exposed to rain while on the ground, the
plastic cover in be placed over the entire console for protection.
d. COMMAND
ACTION:
(1) A command letter has been sent to all units of this battalion
concerning the covering of consoles to protect them from moisture.
(2) Unit
SOP's will be amended to reflect the requirement to cover the consoles to
protect them from moisture.
5. Ground commanders giving mortar firing
azimuths in mils
a. OBSERVATION: This battalion has noted numerous instances
where ground unit commanders have given mortar firing information to the
supporting armed helicopters in mils.
b. EVALUATION: Aircraft commanders are
in the habits of determining all directions in terms of degrees; however, ground
unit commanders give and adjust mortar firing information in mils.
Misinterpretations have occurred on many occasions where aircraft commanders
have been dealing directly with ground unit commanders and have failed to
convert mil readings to degrees. Errors of this magnitude could prove
disastrous.
c. RECOMMENDATIONS: All aircraft commanders should be made aware
of the fact that ground it commanders use the mil system in adjusting fire and
giving firing directions. Point to remember: A request to the ground unit
commander for a readout in degrees usually will result in the desired
answer.
d. COMMAND ACTION: All companies of this battalion are briefings
there pilots on the fact that ground units use the mil system. Pilots are being
instructed on how to use the mil system and how to convert mils to
degrees.
6. Rocket Safety
a. OBSERVATION: Many ammunition and rearming
points are found to contain rockets with no grounding caps or shorting wires
installed. It has also been noted that common practice among aircraft weapons
maintenance personnel is to disconnect the cannon plug leading to the rocket
launcher when performing maintenance on the aircraft or the weapons systems.
This greatly increases the possibility of rocket motor ignition due to static
electricity, radiation from nearby radios or radar, stray voltage and
atmospheric conditions.
b. EVALUATION:
(1) Proper emphasis is not being
placed on rockets handling and safety.
(2) The 2.75" rockets must have either
a grounding cab or shorting wire installed by the manufacturer. These safety
devices are intended to be left on the rocket at all times except when they are
loaded in the launcher.
(3) The intervalometer portion of the rocket systems
provides a ground for each rocket in the launcher. In effect, the grounding cap
or shorting wire is still on the rocket as long as the cannon plugs are
connected. Then the cannon plug is not connected, the intervalometer is not
connected to the rocket forwarded and the grounding feature is lost. The rockets
is then susceptible to accidental firing.
c. RECOGNITION:
(1) That
publications pertaining to rockets handling and safety be reviewed for proper
explanation and use of grounding caps and shorting wires.
(2) That all units
insure that grounding caps or shorting wires be left on rockets until loaded in
launchers and are reinstalled should the rockets launchers be unloaded.
(3)
That rocket launcher cannon plugs remain connected whatever possible.
(4) If
it becomes necessary to disconnect the rocket launcher cannon plugs, all rockets
should be unloaded and grounding caps or shorting wire reinstalled.
(5) That
all maintenance and armament personnel be instructed in the proper handling of
rockets and rocket safety.
d. COMMAND ACTION:
(1) All aviators,
maintenance personnel, and armament personnel are being briefed on the proper
handling of rockets and rocket safety.
(2) All units are inspecting to insure
that grounding caps or shorting wires are being left on rockets until placed in
launchers, and are replaced when rockets are removed from launchers.
(7)
Flight Following of Aircraft
(a) OBSERVATION: Several calls a day are
received by the Battalion Operations Center from units using General Support
Aircraft inquiring as to the location of the aircraft or attempting to really a
message. There have also been occasions when Capital Center has requested
information concerning location of aircraft.
(b) EVALUATION: As a result of
improper or inadequate fight following a great amount of time can be lost by the
aircraft and also by the using unit. Not only time can see lost, but also a
great amount of effort is expended by Capital Center, the Battalion Operations
Center, the Company Operations and the using it in trying to locate an aircraft
or to relay the message.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That companies require a backup
system to the flight following carried on with Capital Center which provides the
company with information concerning their location, intentions and shut down
times. This can be accomplished by flight following with the company, on the
company frequency, in a fashion similar to that employed with Capital Center.
The same results can be obtained by requiring pilots to make position reports to
company operations every 30 minutes, providing the necessary information as
listed above. For aircraft operating out of the range of UHF, a relay using the
aircraft within the company allows for the passing on of the essential data.
This system would enable the unit, and subsequently battalion operations center,
to have communications with each aircraft, and be aware of their location at all
times. It would also enhance the operation both from the standpoint of
efficiency and safety, due to the overlap in responsibility. Any delay in ETA
could be immediately check on.
(d) COMMAND ACTION: All companies of this
battalion are instituting measures to establish a systems of flight following
with their own aircraft.
C. TRAINING
(1) Transition Training of VNAF
Pilots
(a) OBSERVATION: A requirement exist to train an increasing number of
VNAF aviators in the UH-1 series helicopters. The training program set up to
satisfy this requirement has met with a number of difficulties. Of primary
concern is the problem of aircraft availability. This program combined with
communication lapses have resulted in time lost and aircraft availability
wasted.
(b) EVALUATION: The first twenty (20) hours of transition training
for the VNAF pilots is single ship type training devoted to basics, such as
landings, take offs, hovering, steep approaches, autorotations, etc.. It has
been found that the most expedient time to conduct this training, for all
concerned, is in the late afternoon. This is a consequence of the been normal
assigned mission times, which generally run into the late afternoon. These
missions normally utilized 100% of the aircraft available for the day, including
a share aircraft, if one is available. It is imperative that the VNAF pilots are
thoroughly briefed as to the next days been missions and reporting times in
order to be present for training as soon as aircraft become available. Time has
been lost as a result of misunderstanding and lack of communication between the
VNAF pilots and the personnel involved with the training and scheduling. Every
attempt must be made to take full advantage of aircraft availability in order to
fulfill the missions ( to included the necessary flying hours) and thus allow
the VNAF aviators to graduate on schedule. It is necessary to emphasize the fact
that a briefing should take place each night between the A/C and his VNAF
co-pilot concerning the times and places to be the following day. This is to
insure that the co-pilot is exposed to all activities which are carried out each
day, not only during, but also prior to and after each day's mission has been
accomplished. ( To include all pre and post flight inspections and checks,
plenum chamber inspection, etc.)
(c) RECOMMENDATION:
1 That close
coordination be conducted between individuals involved in VNAF training,
scheduling of ships and the VNAF themselves, including those individual A/C's
involved in the next day's training mission. The primary purpose is to reduce
time lost due to shortage of aircraft, and to eliminate misunderstandings which
develop as a result of the language barrier and improper briefings.
2 That
after the first twenty (20) hours of flying, when the VNAF are assigned on
normal daily missions (both direct combat support and general support), training
must be conducted utilizing the most experienced A/C's.
(d) COMMAND ACTION:
The battalion training officer as instructed all companies to coordinate their
training programs and ship scheduling to better utilize existing but limited
resources in order to achieve the desired result of the VNAF transition
program.
(2) Instructor Pilot Shortage
(a) OBSERVATION: The accelerated
VNAF transition pilot program as well as the high turnover rate in personnel,
has left the battalion with a shortage of qualified instructor pilots. These
instructor pilots are required for in-country orientation, 90 day
standardization rides and the first 20 hours of VNAF training.
(b)
EVALUATION: To contend with the shortage of instructor pilots it was found
necessary to initiate a new instructor pilots course at the battalion level.
This course consists of Safety, Maintenance, Aircraft Systems and MOI training
in addition to a full flight program. Flight time is on a proficiency basis with
a minimum of ten (10) hours required on each model and series. The battalion has
also received two school trained instructor pilots from Fort Rucker. These two
aviators are recent graduates of the initial entry aviator course, who were
selected to attend the instructor pilots course. These aviators are well trained
in the fundamentals, however, due to their limited in-country experience, as
well as the lack of knowledge of the potential local flying, (i.e. high density
altitude, wet and dry season hazards, etc.) training being given the supervision
provided any other new in-country aviators, indications are that it will take
approximately three (3) months in-country training will fully qualify to meet
been USARV requirements has instructors pilots. This is nevertheless a
significant reductions in the normal time required to develop an instructor
pilot ( normally four to six months).
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That instructors
pilots courses be establish at the local level whatever possible to better equip
those affected by increasing training requirements established within the
various units.
(d) COMMAND ACTION: Initiation of a training course has taken
place at battalion under supervision and control of the battalion training
officer.
D. INTELLIGENCE
(1) Perimeter Illumination
(a) OBSERVATION:
From past experience on this base and other camps and bases throughout the
Republic of Vietnam, it was noted that there was a need for a better method of
instant illumination for the perimeter. Because of the time element involved in
calling for mortar or artillery illumination or for a flare aircraft, valuable
time was lost in locating the enemy.
(b) EVALUATION: An innovation, the
"Totem Pole Flare", has been used very successfully on the Bien Hoa Air Base.
Its instant availability, relatively simple construction, as outlined in
inclosure 4, and the amount of illumination it provides makes it and invaluable
asset to our defense.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: Due to the success achieved with
the "Totem Pole Flare" during the February post-TET offensive on Bien Hoa Air
Base, the flare could possibly benefit every Army complex, base and compound in
achieving instant and accurate perimeter illumination.
(d) COMMAND ACTION:
The 145th Security Platoon has given instructions on the firing technique and
when to fire the "Totem Pole Flare" to all perimeter guards. This precludes the
premature firing and unnecessary use of the flare.
E. LOGISTICS
(1)
Security of M-14 or M-16 During Flight
(a) OBSERVATIONS: Carrying of the
individual weapon, i.e. M-14 rifle, in the aircraft during flight can be
hazardous and perhaps costly if the weapon is lost. The need for a device to
keep the weapon fixed or stationary during flight is evident.
(b) EVALUATION:
Several instances have occurred in this battalion of individual weapon losses
(M-14 & M-16) from helicopters during the conduct of combat assaults
operations. In all cases the weapons involved have not been tied down or
attached to the aircraft. Instead, they have been wedged in between the seat and
transmission wall, or fit into some similar insecure location. In one instance a
crew chief lost a rifle while sitting on it, and subsequently standing up to
return fire with his M-60 machine gun in a up LZ. In cases where rifles have
been secured to the aircraft by the use of twine or rope, this prevents the
ready accessibility of the weapon in an emergency such as the failure of an M-60
in a hot LZ, thus requiring the instant availability of the secondary
weapons.
(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all assault helicopter companies place on
requisition and install the M-14 rifle mounting kit FSN 2590-045-9611. The it
can be modified with the same configuration to adapt the M-16 rifle. If the kit
is not available, a similar mounting arrangement can be improvised and installed
using parts (bolts, materials, etc.) available in most maintenance supply
hangars. (See Inclosure 5)
(d) COMMAND ACTION: All companies of this
battalion have been notified of the availability of the M-14 rifle mounting kit,
with instructions to install it (or a similar modification) on all
aircraft.
F. MAINTENANCE
(1) Material Failure of the Collective Sleeve
Bearing Set on the UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters
(a) OBSERVATION: An aviator
flying an AH-1G helicopter of this battalion experienced loss of the collective
pitch control, due to failure of the bearing package of the scissors lever
assembly. The pilot lost collective control at 1200 feet, but was able to land
the aircraft by executing a power on autoratation and attempting to zero the
airspeed just prior to touchdown. Major problems were a high rate of decent and
high RPM.
(b) EVALUATION: The investigation revealed that the probable cause
of the failure of the collective sleeve bearing was inadequate lubrication. The
lubrication instructions and intervals as stated in the -20 manuals for the UH-1
aircraft with respect to the swashplate, scissors and collective sleeve assembly
are inadequate for existing environmental conditions. It was also realized that
forced landing with complete loss of collective control is a procedure that is
not normally discussed during safety meetings and pilot briefings. Many pilots
are not aware of what the aircraft will do if this situation arises, and are not
familiar with the procedures to follow in its event.
(c) RECOMMENDATION:
1
That all grease points of the swashplate and support assembly and scissors and
sleeve assembly with the exception of the collective sleeve splines and
collective sleeve bearings, be lubricated at each 25 hours of operation.
2
Care should be taken to purge lubricate those points which are indicated has
purge points in Chapter 2 of the applicable -20 manual.
3 The collective
sleeve splines be lubricated by hand packing, and the collective sleeve bearing
be purge lubricated at each 50 operating hour intervals. In order to exposed the
upper and lower collective sleeves bearing seals, it will be necessary to remove
the retaining wire and to slide the lower boot down from the support ring
(C&C models) and to remove the six bolts which secure the extension and
spline plate to the hub allowing the spline plate and extension to be
raised.
4 That all pilots be briefed on emergency procedures to follow in the
event of complete collective failure, and in the problems they will encounter
when these failures occur, i.e. high rate of decent, high RPM, etc..
(d)
COMMAND ACTION:
1 All maintenance supervisors and mechanics have been
informed of the problems which can be expected when maintenance personnel fail
to comply with lubrication instructions and procedures.
2 A maintenance
bulletin was distributed to all aircraft maintenance elements assigned or
attached to this battalion specifying detailed instructions and lubricating
intervals for lubricating critical bearings for existing environmental
conditions.
3 All pilots within the been battalion have been briefed on
emergency procedures associated with collective failures, and these have been
incorporated into regular safety briefings and instructions.
4 An EIR
(Equipment Improvements Recommendation, DA form 2407) was submitted through
channels in accordance with TM 38-750 and USARV Reg 750-20 concerning proper
lubrication under local environmental conditions for collective sleeve bearing
assembly on the UH-1 and AH-1G helicopters.
(2) material failure of the
internal splines on the tail rotor gear box quill couplings of the UH-1 and
AH-1G helicopters
(a) OBSERVATION: On two separate occasions this battalion
experienced anti-torque failure on UH-1D helicopters due to material failure of
the gear box quill coupling. The probable cause of the failure was inadequate
lubrication. Adequate lubrication can be as a result of improper lubrication
procedures and/or failure of the coupling seals 3
(b) RECOMMENDATION:
1
That a one time inspection be conducted to ascertain that the drive shaft hanger
bearing assemblies and tail rotor drive shaft couplings are properly
lubricated.
2 All flexible couplings should be inspected thoroughly during
the PMD.
3 That tail rotor drive shaft couplings and hanger assemblies be
inspected and lubricated at every third periodic inspection instead of every 500
hours.
(c) COMMAND ACTION:
1 All aviators and maintenance personnel were
briefed on the inspection and maintenance of drive shaft couplings and hanger
bearings assemblies.
2 A maintenance bulletin was distributed to all units
assigned or attached to this battalion stressing proper inspection procedures
and changing the lubrication intervals from the current 500 to 300 hours. (Incl
7)
3 A one time inspections of all flexible couplings was conducted on each
aircraft.
4 An EIR was submitted through channels in accordance with TM
38-750 and USARV Reg 750-20 concerning proper lubrication and inspections
scheduling for the tail rotor drive shaft couplings and hanger
assemblies.
(3) Aircraft Technical Inspectors: A serious problem of obtaining
an adequate number of qualified Technical Inspectors (MOS 67Y30, 67N30) was
experienced during this last quarter within the battalion. The critical shortage
is evidenced by the fact that the battalion is authorized a total of 17
Technical Inspectors by MTOE; presently, there are only 10 assigned with 9
losses projected within the next 90 days. The anticipated and projected
replacement of normal rotational losses will not presently meet the demand
imposed by the tactical situation and environmental conditions. A letter was
forwarded to Commanding Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group, requesting that
command action be initiated to establish a comprehensive in-country course of
instruction for the training of aircraft Technical Inspectors by the 34th
General Support Group at the earliest practicable time.
G. ORGANIZATION:
NONE
H. SURVIVAL, ESCAPE AND EVASION: NONE
AVFBC-EE-H (13 May 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat
Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (UIC,
WCYNAA)
DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 3 JUN 1969
THRU:
Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade, ATTN: AVBA-C APO 96307
Commanding
General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC (DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US
Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force
Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.20310
This headquarters
has reviewed in concurs with the operational report & lessons learned of the
145th Combat Aviation Battalion for the period ending 30 April 1969, with the
following comment: Reference paragraph 6, Rocket Safety, on page 15. Units
responsible for operating Army Aircraft Logistics Area in III CTZ have been
instructed to take steps to insure that rockets are stored with safety devices
intact.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
B.G. MACDONALD
1LT. AGC
Asst AG
AVBAGC-O (13 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat
Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (UIC,
WCYNAA)
DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384 6 JUN 1969
THRU:
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO
96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558
TO:
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C.20310
1. This headquarters has reviewed this report,
considers it to be adequate and concurs with the contents as indorsed.
2. The
following additional comments are considered pertinent:
a. Paragraph 1G (3)
(a), page 8. This request for construction was forwarded to USARV on 18 April
1969, and is presently being staffed by USARV and USAECAV for design
requirements. Project is dependent upon release of funds by DOD.
B. Paragraph
B6, page 15. This headquarters is in complete agreement with this comment,
recommendation, and command action. Reproduction of this comment will be
included in the next 1st Aviation Brigade G-4 Maintenance and Supply
Newsletter.
c. Paragraph F(c)1, page 20. From all indications the
recommendations and command action were in keeping with general instructions of
appropriate TM-20's which states lubrication instructions are for normal
operations and under address conditions lubrication is encouraged at more
frequent intervals.
d. Paragraph F(2), page 21. Comment and action taken is
deemed appropriate in adjusting the inspection and lubrication criteria to the
condition of operations. This comment will be discussed in the next 1st Aviation
Brigade G-4 Maintenance and Supply Newsletter.
e. Paragraph F(3), page 21. As a result of action taken by this headquarters, USARV is instituting a Technical Inspector course at
AVBAGC-O
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat Aviation Battalion
for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (UIC, WCYNAA)
the AART School. It is anticipated that the course will commence on 1 July 1969.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
W. H. PIERCE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General
AVHGC-DST (13 May 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th Combat
Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (RCS CSFOR-65) (RI) (UIC,
WCYNAA)
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 JUN 1969
TO: Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Reports - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 145th Combat Aviation Battalion.
2. Reference item concerning instructors pilot shortages, section II, page 18, paragraph E(2); concur. To overcome the degradation of effectiveness occasioned by current rotation policies and subsequent loss of experienced personnel in key positions, commanders are encouraged to establish training programs at the lowest possible level.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General
Cy furn:
145th
CAB
1st Avn Bde
GPOP-DT (13 May 69) 5th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 145th
Combat Aviation Battalion for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65
(RI)
HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 11 JUL 69
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310
This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:
C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG